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In the present study we analyse relevant macro-  and microeconomic forces 
driving inflation in the Czech Republic with a particular focus on how these 
channels are likely to change in the wake of euro adoption. We employ an ARDL 
model combined with the Bayesian Model Averaging technique. In order to carry 
out this analysis, we also estimate the time-varying natural rate of interest purged 
from the risk premium. Our results suggest that the costs arising from the 
discontinuation of nominal trend appreciation of the koruna after euro adoption 
are likely to be rather low. In contrast, a low inflation environment and a 
harmonization of the business cycles between the Czech Republic and the euro 
area are essential for ensuring that inflation hikes will remain limited after the euro 
adoption. The fulfilment of the Maastricht inflation criterion should not be 
enforced by policy measures that would artificially reduce inflation temporarily. 
The potential inflationary effect of the changeover cannot be eliminated 
altogether but it may well be substantially reduced by applying best practices 
based on the experience of current euro area participants. 
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September 2008 1 Introduction
The current lack of an ocial target date for euro adoption after the orig-
inally envisaged horizon of 2010 has been abandoned does not preclude
an intense and prominent discussion on costs and benets of the euro
in the Czech Republic. It is noteworthy that this debate is very much
focused on one particular aspect of the cost-benet-analysis, namely the
expected impact of the single currency on in
ation. This might be due
to the fact that concerns about higher in
ation are a key issue for the
general public. According to the Eurobarometer survey from November
2007, 74 % of citizens in the EU - New Member States (NMS)1 and 80%
of the Czech respondents agree with the statement that the euro will
increase prices (see Eurobarometer 2007). Since in
ation expectations
might have a substantial impact on future in
ation rates, it is essential
for the sake of future price stability to provide the public with even-
handed, understandable and transparent arguments in this debate.
Hence, against this background, the objective of the present paper
is to contribute putting the discussion about the possible in
ationary
impact of the euro in the Czech Republic on a rm and solid footing. In
other words, we aim at analysing in a qualitative and quantitative man-
ner the channels through which the euro adoption might have an eect
on in
ation both in the short and long run, embedded in a framework
of other cyclical, structural and external in
ation factors.
It should be stressed in passing that the present study does not as-
pire to provide a comprehensive analysis of the net welfare gains of the
single currency so as to work out whether or when to adopt the euro in
a particular country. It rather intends to shed some light on the specic
issue of whether euro adoption will have an in
ationary impact which
plays a central role in the discussion in the Czech Republic. In addition,
it should be born in mind that we neither address the question whether
higher in
ation rates in a transition country might be justifyable (or
even desirable) in as much as they are driven by the catching-up pro-
cess. We are merely interested in the question whether the substitution
of the national currency for the euro will or can lead to a higher one-o
and/or trend in
ation2.
1By NMS we mean the following countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria and
Romania.
2An additional, related question would be whether also in
ation volatility around
the trend will increase in the wake of euro adoption. Although we do not address
this issue explicitly in this paper it can be stated that the correlation between the
2To begin with, the most apparent direct consequence implied by the
accession to the euro area is the replacement of national notes and coins
for their euro counterparts. Though this changeover should be a mere
nominal event in theory, it can be argued that it does entail some risks
of price increases. However, even if such risks can probably not be elim-
inated altogether they might be substantially reduced by best-practice
policies as the experience of a number of current euro area members sug-
gests. Moreover, we will argue that possible price rises brought about
by the changeover would be of a rather limited and temporary nature,
if in particular a sucient degree of competition is ensured.
A much more important consequence of the euro adoption than the
one-o changeover eect is the fact that joining a monetary union im-
plies the abandonment of an autonomous monetary policy. It is natural
to conjecture that the interest rate set for a union consisting of not en-
tirely homogeneous economies might deviate from the interest rate that
would be convenient for a single country. Hence, were the country in
question to adopt, alongside with the euro, interest rates that would be
too low to ensure internal equilibrium it would most likely have to face a
higher trend in
ation. In order to analyse this issue econometrically we
rst estimate the time-varying real natural interest rate by means of an
unobserved components model based on Harvey (1989). Horv ath (2007)
is to our best knowledge the only study so far to estimate the (nominal)
natural interest rate for the Czech Republic using various specications
of Taylor-type rules and our results can thus provide a useful compari-
son. In addition, however, in the spirit of Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004)
we also estimate the natural rate of interest purged from the risk premia
which is probably the rst attempt to do so for the Czech Republic.
Notwithstanding the changeover and the abandonment of monetary
autonomy, the most conventional argument put forward in the discus-
sion on in
ationary impacts of the euro centers around the substantial
price level gap with respect to the euro area which is characteristic for a
catching-up economy as the Czech Republic. Price level convergence is
carried out via nominal exchange rate appreciation on the one hand, and
a positive in
ation dierential relative to the euro area on the other. It is
usually argued that the latter is driven by typical transition phenomena
such as lower productivity growth in the non-tradable sector relative to
the tradable sector (e.g. Holman 2006) or gradual shifts to higher qual-
level and the volatility of in
ation is typically highly positive (see e.g. Fischer, Sahay
and V egh 2002).
3ity goods (Bruha and Podpiera 2007). These authors conclude that if
the nominal appreciation channel is closed after xing the exchange rate
to the euro, in
ation will inevitably have to accelerate in order to keep
the pace of real appreciation. We will have a close look at this line of
argument which we do not quite share. In contrast, we believe that it
is not the loss of a 
exible exchange rate per se that implies a higher
in
ation rate. The size of the possible price hike ascribable to the lack
of nominal appreciation will depend essentially on the extent with which
exchange rate movements are passed through onto consumer prices. If
this exchange rate pass-through is strong then the nominal appreciation
has a signicant dampening eect on in
ation thus rendering a peg more
costly.
After a qualitative discussion we test the relative importance of those
in
ation channels through which the euro might strike along with other
relevant cyclical, external and structural in
ation factors based on  Egert
(2007a,b) in an autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL) model. Since
standard model selection criteria do not lead to consistent results, in
line with the recommendations made by Yang (2004) we combine all
models under a proper weighting scheme by employing the Bayesian
Model Averaging technique. In order to reduce the intractably large
model space we use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Composite
algorithm. The results suggest that a harmonization of the business
cycle with the euro area and a low in
ation environment are essential
for a smooth in
ation path. However, the latter should not be enforced
by non-standard measures such as withholding necessary adjustments of
regulated prices. In contrast, consistently with the existing literature we
do not nd much evidence either for the Balassa-Samuelson-eect or a
strong exchange rate pass-through.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section provides
some stylized facts on the in
ation development of the rst-wave euro
area countries and the three countries that have opted out. Against
this backdrop the third section seeks to identify and 
esh out those
relevant in
ation forces that are likely to be aected in the wake of
the euro adoption via both the common monetary policy as well as the
cash changeover. Anticipating the subsequent econometric test we also
describe the operationalization of these channels for the empirical esti-
mation and the data. In the fourth section we rst describe the data,
the remaining variables and brie
y the method employed, while details
are provided in the apendices. Subsequently we sketch out the results.
The last section wraps up and derives interesting policy conclusions.
42 Stylized facts
Before we delve into the channels through which the euro might aect
in
ation in the Czech Republic it is helpful to have a brief look at some
stylized facts regarding the European economic and monetary unica-
tion process and its eects on in
ation. The creation of the euro area
in the sense of a single monetary policy under the responsibility of one
European Central Bank (ECB) dates back to January 1, 1999. On that
day the third and nal stage of the economic and monetary unica-
tion process was launched with the irrevocable xing of the exchange
rates of the currencies of the 11 initially participating Member States
(henceforth also referred to as EU-11) and the euro thus became their
legal tender.3 Greece joined the club on January 1, 2001.4 One year
later, on January 1 2002, euro coins and banknotes were put into cir-
culation and thus replaced the 12 national currencies which had, since
1999, represented only dierent denominations of the single currency.5
Except for Denmark and the United Kingdom which negotiated an opt-
out, the Treaty on European Union (Treaty) signed in Maastricht in
February 1992 obliges all current and future EU members to adopt the
euro as their legal tender after meeting the so called Convergence (or
Maastricht) criteria. Besides the criterion on price stability, government
nances and long-term interest rates each euro-candidate must have par-
ticipated in the exchange-rate mechanism (now ERM II) for at least two
years preceding the convergence examination without any break and
without severe tensions.6 Sweden is the only 'old' EU member with no
opt-out from the Treaty that has not yet introduced the euro, as it has
not joined ERM II and has thus not met the exchange rate criterion.
In contrast, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus have been as of today the only
NMS to enter the euro area.
Hence, if we want to collect some stylized facts on the in
ation impact
of the euro in the 12 initial countries we have to make a clear distinction
between the period following the launch of the common currency and
monetary policy on January 1, 1999 (and January 1, 2001 in case of
Greece, respectively) on the one hand, and the period after January 1,
3Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Aus-
tria, Portugal, Finland
4The initial 11 euro area countries and Greece will be referred to as EU-12.
5For details on the history of the Economic and Monetary Union see e.g.
www.ecb.eu.
6See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html
52002 on which date the cash changeover took place on the other. In case
of countries that joined or will join the euro area later both eects, the
one brought about by the abandonment of monetary policy autonomy
and the one caused by the currency changeover, fall together.
After a visual inspection of Figure 1 depicting in
ation paths for
EU-11 it strikes that in most countries in
ation7 eased somewhat or
remained broadly stable in the year following the creation of the euro
area. In 2000 the cycle reached a turning point and in
ation rose un-
til it peaked in the course of 2001 followed by a slowdown, dierently
pronounced in the respective countries. Also the subsequent path sug-
gests a recognizable cyclical pattern up until 2007 similar in most EU-11
countries. The average in
ation rate in the euro area rose from 1.5% in
the two years preceding the creation of the euro area to 1.9% between
1999 and 2006. In contrast, if we compare the same periods in two EU
but non-euro area countries, Sweden and the UK, in
ation remained
stable in the former at 1.5% and declined from 1.7% to 1.1% in the lat-
ter. Thus, these numbers might evoke the hypothesis that in general the
common monetary policy has led to some in
ation acceleration. Such a
conclusion, however, would be premature. Figure 2 displays three panels
in which the in
ation cycle in three non-euro EU countries, Denmark,
Sweden and the UK is drawn against the in
ation paths in an appro-
priate euro area-counterpart, with some lag where appropriate. In most
EU-11 countries the in
ation cycle happened to head downwards to its
local minimum prior to 1999 and made a U-turn after that. Therefore it
is not surprising that in
ation appears to have accelerated in the wake
of a common monetary policy. However, as can be seen in the rst panel
of Figure 2 the in
ation paths in Denmark matched the one in Finnland
very closely. Correspondingly, very similar to the euro area performance
the average in
ation in Denmark thus rose from 1.6% in 1997-1998 to
2% between 1999 and 2006. In Sweden and the UK where the cycle
appears to be lagged by some 6 and 14 months (second and third panel
of Figure 2), respectively, the downward paths to the local minimum
corresponds to the period 1997-1999 in case of Sweden and 1997-2000
for the UK. If we compare the average in
ation in these two respective
periods to the average in
ation in the second half of the sample we nd
that price increases accelerated by 0.5 percentage points in Sweden and
0.2 percentage points in Britain8.
7Measured by a 12-month-moving average of the y-o-y change of the HICP.
8For a more detailed analysis of the in
ation development before and after the
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Figure 1: HICP (12-month moving average of the y-o-y change) and
perceived in
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Germany lagged by 14m UK
Correlation: 0.69
Figure 2: HICP (12-month moving average of the y-o-y change) in the
non-EMU countries relative to selected EMU
8Concerning the in
ationary eect of the euro changeover in January
2002, a simple eyeballing of Figure 1 suggests what has been concluded
by several studies after a much more sophisticated and comprehensive
analysis9: Substantial and wide-spread price increases about which the
public had been concerned prior to the introduction of euro coins and
notes10 did not occur. Even though there was a slight in
ation accel-
eration in some countries and also in the EU-12 as a whole in the rst
three months of 2002 (light grey window), the impact was transitory and
in most countries price increases slowed down again within a couple of
weeks (dark grey window). Hence, on balance, there is no evidence un-
derpinning the notion that the euro changeover had a remarkable impact
on the overall consumer price in
ation. Moreover, as Hobijn et al. (2004)
note, the in
ation experience in the initial 12 euro area countries was
not very dierent from that in Denmark, Sweden, and Britain. However,
while the European Commission estimates that the changeover impact
on the overall HICP in
ation ranged between 0.12 and 0.29 percent-
age points in 200211 there were signicant and persistent price increases
in some specic branches, particularly in some services such as restau-
rants, cafes and hairdressers.12 Therefore, while the average annualized
monthly in
ation rate in the EU-12 restaurant and cafe sector over the
period January 1995 through March 2004 was 2.8%, in January 2002 in-

ation in that sector went up to 15.6% (see Hobijn et al. 2004). As these
price rises were particularly visible, they apparently aected perceived
in
ation much more strongly than their share in the consumer basket
would have suggested.
In parallel to the debate on the impact of the euro area on in
ation
the euro gave rise to an unprecedented break in the consumers' percep-
tion of price increases that sharply contradicts actual in
ation gures.
This can be seen in Figure 1 which displays apart from the HICP also
the so called balance statistic of the in
ation perception survey carried
out among consumers by the European Commission on a monthly basis.
The balance statistic is calculated as the dierence between a weighted
proportion of respondents stating that prices have risen and those stat-
ing that prices have fallen or stayed about the same.13 The distance
9See e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank (2004), Eife (2006) or Hobijn et al. (2004).
10See Commission of the European Communities (2001).
11The eect was probably largest in the Netherlands, 0.6 percentage points (see
Folkertsma et al. 2002) and in Italy, 0.5 percentage points (Aucremanne et al. 2007).
12See http://ec.europa.eu/economy nance/euro/faqs/faqs 16 en.htm
13There are six possible answers to the question: "How do you think that
consumer prices have developed over the last 12 months?". A(1) "risen a
lot"; A(2) "risen moderately"; A(3) "risen slightly"; A(4) "stayed about
9between the two curves in Figure 1 thus measures the size of the per-
ception gap. While in most countries in
ation perception followed the
actual in
ation rather closely prior to the changeover in January 2002
the gap widened substantially immediately thereafter and continued to
grow until early 2003. Then it either remained stable or shrank until
end 2006 and seems to have been broadening again since. Aucremanne
et al (2007) conrm the anecdotal evidence by showing that this gap
is econometrically signicant and that there was no such break in the
in
ation perception in 2002 in the control panel of those three countries
that have opted out of the Monetary Union so far.
We can conclude this section by looking at the data from Slovenia
which is often cited as the obvious evidence for the in
ationary impact
of the euro. Although prices actually went down in Slovenia m-o-m in
January and February 2007 the y-o-y in
ation rate did, indeed, accel-
erate over the course of 2007 and amounted to 5.7% in December 2007.
However, the popular view to blame the euro for this pick-up is ques-
tioned if we contrast the in
ation development in Slovenia with the one
in the Czech Republic. As can be seen in Figure 3, despite dierent ex-
change rate regimes in
ation rates in the Czech Republic and Slovenia
have co-moved virtually over the entire sample period. While the level
gap widened somewhat in 1999 and reached its maximum in 2003 since
2004 the gap has become innitesimaly narrow with a correlation 0.8 be-
tween the two series. Since the euro introduction in Slovenia in January
2007 the correlation amounted to as much as 0.94 as the in
ation rate in
the Czech Republic also rose over the course of 2007 and reached 5.5%
in December. Moreover, both series are integrated of order one and the
residuals of a mutual correlation are highly stationary suggesting that a
spurious relationship between the series is rather unlikely.
Hence, although in
ation in each respective country might have been
driven to some extent by idiosyncratic factors (including euro adoption
in Slovenia) it would be unfounded to mainly blame the euro for the
recent in
ationary development in Slovenia. In fact, according to the
study by Deloitte Consulting (2007) there was only a slight acceleration
of in
ation in Slovenia attributable to the euro introduction amount-
ing to mere 0.3 percentage points or less14. According to the Bank of
the same"; A(5) "fallen" and A(6) "do not know". The balance statis-
tic is thus computed as: Bit = Ait(1) + 0:5Ait(2)   0:5Ait(4)   Ait(5) (See:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy nance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys en.htm)
14Identical or even slightly lower impact of the euro on in
ation in Slovenia was
estimated also by, respectively, Eurostat and the Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis
10Slovenia (2008) the rise of the in
ation rate has been primarily fuelled
by other determinants such as economic overheating15 and external fac-
tors such as oil and food prices. Particularly the latter have increased by
twice as much as in other EU countries due to, as anecdotal evidence sug-
gests, insucient competition in the retail market (see e.g. Eurobusiness
2007). While the actual impact of the euro on in
ation thus seems to
have been rather moderate, in
ation perception literally skyrocketed in
parallel and the gap between actual and perceived in
ation has reached
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Figure 3: HICP (y-o-y change) in the Czech Republic and Slovenia




3.1.1 Price Level Convergence and Nominal Appreciation
The usual argument put forward for why the euro adoption is expected to
increase in
ation goes approximately like this: The relative price level
and Development of the Republic of Slovenia (IMAD) (see Bank of Slovenia (2008)
for references).
15The output gap has been positive since early 2006. While it steeply widened
until mid 2007 it seems to be closing ever since.
11in the euro candidate country is substantially lower than in the euro
area. Therefore, there is a high potential for price catch-up both in the
tradable and non-tradable sector. While in the former price convergence
is driven for instance by a gradual shift to higher-quality-goods that
are typically more expensive (Bruha and Podpiera 2007), in the non-
tradable sector it is particularly the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) eect.16
At the same time the respective transition economy is often characterized
by a trend nominal appreciation of its currency which in combination
with the price catch-up process brings about a signicant appreciation
of the equilibrium real exchange rate. In other words, the rate of real
exchange rate appreciation is given by the sum of the nominally ap-
preciating exchange rate (the so called exchange rate channel) and the
in
ation dierential between the home country and the euro area (i.e.
the in
ation channel). However, if nominal appreciation is no longer
possible after the euro adoption it follows that the real exchange rate
appreciation will take place completely via the in
ation channel as it is
the only one remaining. To put it with Suster et al. (2006):
In the long run it can be expected that after joining the euro area
the in
ation in Slovakia will be higher than in
ation in the euro area
by a margin which will be about equal to appreciation rate of the equi-
librium real exchange rate of koruna against euro. (...) If the current
annual appreciation rate of the equilibrium real exchange rate of koruna
was maintained at the level of approximately 2-3% also after entry to the
euro area, the in
ation in Slovakia could be in a short run higher than
in the rest of the euro area by such a dierence.
Concerning the Czech Republic, Holman (2006) estimated that if the
Czech Republic had adopted the euro back then annual in
ation would
have hovered around 6% after rising by about 3 percentage points which
corresponds to the average annual appreciation of the koruna.17 Mach
(2003) goes even a dimension further and predicts that in
ation will re-
turn to annual 10% from the rst half of the 1990s.18
If our reading of the above argument sequence is correct it seems to
assume that the recently observed rate of real exchange rate appreciation
16For a recent formal discussion of the Balassa-Samuelson eect see e.g.  Egert
(2007b).
17This estimate was published in June 2006 after the annual in
ation rate (mea-
sured by the CPI, the target index of the CNB) had reached 1.9% in 2005 and
averaged 2.9% between January and May 2006.
18For a slightly dierent perspective of the same issue see Bruha and Podpiera
(2007).
12will be maintained also after euro area entry. In such a case, it indeed
follows by denition that the in
ation rate will have to rise by the current
rate of nominal appreciation once the exchange rate channel is closed.
However, to postulate a constant real appreciation is possible if and only
if exchange rate movements are currently passed-through into consumer
prices by 100% or if in
ation started to accelerate for some other reason
but the loss of the exchange rate channel. To judge whether this is a
plausible assumption we have to investigate how high the exchange rate
pass-through in the Czech Republic is and for which other reasons the
introduction of the euro could lead to a discrete in
ation acceleration.
Concerning the latter, a natural conjecture would be that the euro
adoption will give a one-o boost to the speed of price level convergence
due to higher transparency and comparability of prices. In the Czech
Republic the price level of total goods reached nearly 74% of the euro
area level in 2006, while the price level in services amounted to mere
42% of the euro area19. Consequently, there is certainly enough scope
for price level convergence both in the tradable and the non-tradable
sector. However, the literature seems to conclude almost unanimously
that while price level convergence in the EU and the euro area was
spurred by the establishment of a common market at the beginning of
the 1990s the introduction of a common currency had no signicant ef-
fect (see e.g. the discussion in Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 2007). As  Egert
(2007a) documents and Figure 4 visualises the ranking of the price levels
strongly correlates with the ordering of the countries in terms of GDP
per capita. Hence, it follows that the price level is determined to a
great extent by economic development and the price level convergence
in the Czech Republic will thus gradually continue as the country be-
comes richer. However, it seems highly unlikely that the convergence
process could receive a distinct one-time boost after the euro adoption
as a result of better price transparency.
But if it is not for higher price transparency are there any other
forces which could discretely change in the wake of the euro adoption
and make in
ation suddenly accelerate? In general, the literature puts
forward the following determinants of price level convergence (see e.g.
 Egert 2007 a,b): i) the shift to higher-quality goods as households grow
richer; ii) changes in pricing to market practices suggesting that pro-
ducers take into account the disposable income in a particular economy
and adjust their price setting to the purchasing power of households; iii)
























Figure 4: Price level vs. GDP/capita
the nominal exchange rate appreciation. In fact, the rst three of these
factors are at work irrespective of the monetary regime or the state of
monetary integration. Therefore, they will not be aected by the euro
adoption and are inappropriate as explanations for any discrete in
ation
acceleration.
Moreover, as far as the B-S-eect is concerned, empirical evidence on
its signicance in the Czech Republic seems mixed at best. While some
older studies estimated a rather sizable B-S-eect20, a whole plethora
of more recent studies pioneered by Flek et al. (2002) found only a
negligible impact of the B-S-eect on in
ation (partially even negative,
depending on the methodology).  Egert, Halpern and MacDonald (2006)
provide a very comprehensive survey of the literature on this issue and
conclude that the in
ation contribution of the B-S-eect is close to 0 in
the Czech Republic21. While Kovacs (2002) believes that the low im-
pact of the B-S-eect can already give an upper estimate that should
become even weaker in the course of the catch-up process as produc-
tivity dierentials moderate Flek et. al (2002) disagree. According to
20For example, the B-S-eect contributed 4.3 percentage points to in
ation in
Golinelli and Orsi (2001) or 2.8 percentage points according to Sinn and Reutter
(2001).
21For a recent discussion of the reasons for the small size of the B-S-eect which
basically question the assumptions of the model see e.g.  Egert (2007b).
14them the productivity growth in the tradable sector will accelerate as
the catching-up process moves on because real convergence in the Czech
Republic did not record any remarkable progress throughout the 1990s.
One of the most recent updates by  Egert (2007a) seems to support this
hypothesis as his upper bound estimates have increased compared to
earlier results and range between 0.7 and 1.9 percentage points for the
Czech Republic. Hence, if the strength of the B-S-eect were to increase
in the future, in
ation would accelerate relative to its euro area coun-
terpart. But, to stress it again, such a development would not at all be
the result of any particular monetary regime choice.
The next among the drivers of price level convergence listed above
is the deregulation of administered prices. Their share in the consumer
basket amounts to approximately 20% in the Czech Republic22, a num-
ber similar to the euro area level. In addition, in
ation of regulated ser-
vices has been almost persistently above the in
ation rate of the overall
consumer basket as can be seen in Figure 5. We can thus conjecture
that increases of administered prices have a signicant impact on the
overall in
ation. The outstanding question of interest in the context of
the present paper is: how will regulated prices develop in the future,
particularly after joining the euro area?
According to  Egert (2007b), there are three main reasons why reg-
ulated prices are likely to rise faster than the overall CPI also in the
future. Firstly, prices of some of the regulated categories might still be
below the cost recovery ratio (e.g. rents) and/or below the EU level such
as electricity and gas which reached in the Czech Republic in 2006 some
70% of the EU-level. Secondly, the capital stock of some sectors such as
railways or public transportation is outdated and urgently needs mas-
sive investments. Lastly, the level of liberalisation in regulated sectors
is often subject to hot political debates in which some politicians might
be reluctant to price increases and prefer to postpone them for later,
especially until after elections.
22Using the three-digit COICOP disaggregation level of the HICP from New Cronos
and following the broad concept of price regulated service categories proposed by
 Egert (2007b) our denition includes: refuse and sewerage collection, medical, dental
and paramedical services, hospital services, passenger transport by railway and by
road, postal services, education, social protection, cultural services, rents and energy
prices related to housing. Though price regulation mostly concerns services there
are also some goods such as pharmaceutical products, alcoholic beverages or tobacco
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Figure 5: In
ation of price regulated services vs. HICP/CPI
While the rst two arguments are not immediately related to the
currency in circulation the quintessence of the last point does apply to
the issue of euro adoption. Generally speaking, if a country keen on
adopting the euro does not meet the Maastricht price stability criterion
with a convenient margin - which might be the case in transition CEE
for reasons described above - policy makers will be naturally looking
for ways to take o further strain from the in
ation rate. Hence, polit-
ical representatives might have an incentive to strike in
ation-curbing
deals with the private sector and/or to postpone more than indispens-
able hikes of administered prices until after the euro adoption. In such
a case, in
ation might indeed appear to have accelerated as a conse-
quence of the euro introduction which would then be the easiest patsy
to blame. A similar materialization of this incentive structure seems to
have happened for instance in Greece,23 where the fullment of the in
a-
tion criterion prior to the euro adoption was helped by cuts in indirect
taxes and gentlemen's agreements between the government and com-
mercial and industrial enterprises, as well as service providers (see ECB
2000).24 However, since 2001, the awareness in the euro area as regards
23In Slovenia the government and the Bank of Slovenia helped to curb in
ation with
coordinated policy measures such as strict implementation of administered prices
(increases not above headline in
ation), counter-cyclical adjustment of excise duties
on fuels and wage moderation based on a social agreement (see IMAD 2007).
24Annual in
ation in Greece soared from 2.1% in 1999 to 3.9% in 2002 which might
16policy measures that might artically lower in
ation for some time, in
particular in the context of the fullment of the Maastricht criteria, has
risen substantially and the Treaty in fact provides good reason for alert-
ness in this respect, given that it stresses that convergence must be found
to be sustainable in order to arrive at a positive convergence assessment.
The last determinant of price level convergence we need to look at
is the nominal exchange rate. While doing so we have to make a clear
distinction between its role in the price level convergence process and
its impact on in
ation. A nominally appreciating currency increases the
price level expressed in euros and thus speeds up the price level con-
vergence. For the in
ation development, however, it is not the nominal
appreciation as such that matters but the pass-through of exchange rate
movements on consumer prices. On the one hand, the higher the the
exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) and the higher the nominal appre-
ciation rate, the bigger the dampening eect on the overall in
ation. On
the other hand, however, the higher the ERPT the less pronounced will
be the eect of nominal appreciation on price level convergence. Con-
versely, a lower ERPT implies a more signicant convergence of price
levels but provides less help in curbing in
ation.
 Egert (2007b) argues that the extent to which exchange rate changes
are translated into domestic prices hinges primarily on the price setting
practice of rms in the particular country, the composition of imports
and expectations. In an in
ation targeting regime where expectations
are anchored by credibly communicated in
ation targets and not by the
exchange rate itself the ERPT should be low. Moreover, Taylor (2000)
coins the idea that the fact that the ERPT has declined over time and
that it is typically lower in developed market economies is ascribable to
generally lower in
ation rates. In a microeconomic model he shows that
with declining in
ation people perceive cost changes as less persistent,
adjust prices less frequently and thus incorporate exchange rate changes
less often.
have been, to some extent caused by the non-renewal of the gentlemen's agreements.
For instance the Athens News Agency reported on August 22, 2002 in 'Finance min-
ister pledges intensied eorts against in
ation': "This new and worrying surge in
in
ation signals a clear-cut failure of the government's policy of 'gentlemen's agree-
ments (...) These agreements are based on an unbridled operation of markets and
a lack of eective checks and measures against violators", Dimitris Papadimoulis,
economic and social aairs spokesman of the Coalition of the Left and Progress. He
added that state-owned companies had often led the pack in unjustied rate rises,
setting an example for the rest of the market, which meant that price hikes were
transferred down to the consumer.
17Given these arguments, how important is the exchange rate pass-
through in the Czech Republic? On the one hand, it is certainly a
rather small and open economy with a relatively high share of imported
nal and intermediate goods. On the other hand, the CNB operates
an in
ation targeting regime with a long and successful track record
and the Czech economy has experienced a strong disin
ation over the
course of the transition period. Empirical studies come to the conclusion
that the ERPT in the Czech Republic is quite tenuous. While e.g. Ca'
Zorzi et al. (2007) nd that the one-year ERPT amounts to about 0.6
many other studies estimate it close to 0 or sometimes even negative (see
e.g. Darvas (2001) or Coricelli, Jazbec and Masten (2004)). Coricelli,
 Egert and MacDonald (2006) report the average of non-negative, eec-
tive pass-through estimates from a literature survey reaching mere 0.2.
In the context of the present paper we are interested in the pass-through
of the koruna-euro-exchange rate. Therefore, we will approximate the
pass-through from the euro area by including an openness indicator de-
ned along the lines of  Egert (2007a) as the nominal exchange rate of
the euro vis--vis the koruna multiplied by imports from the 'old' EU-15
Member States25 relative to GDP. An increase of this indicator due to
an appreciation of the koruna and/or higher imports from the EU-15
would thus be expected to result in a lower in
ation and should there-
fore carry a negative sign. The quarterly available data on imports and
GDP were obtained from Eurostat and had to be linearly interpolated
while Thomson Financial provides exchange rates on a daily basis and
we took monthly averages. Alternatively to the openness indicator we
will test the relevance of the exchange rate on in
ation by including a
simple annual rate of change of the exchange rate.
3.1.2 Natural Interest Rate Too Low?
It is not only the exchange rate that is abandoned after euro area entry
but in fact the autonomous monetary policy run by the national cen-
tral bank.26 Unless the monetary union is a perfectly optimal currency
area it is natural that the interest rate set for so many countries might
not necessarily be the most appropriate one for each particular member
state. Hence, it could happen that with the introduction of the euro the
country adopts too loose a monetary policy bringing about in
ation ac-
25Apart from the EU-12 dened above EU-15 contains also the UK, Denmark and
Sweden.
26To which extent the monetary policy can be autonomous in small and open
economies shall be left aside.
18celeration. In other words, if the country's natural interest rate, dened
along the lines of Laubach and Williams (2001) as the short-term inter-
est rate at which output converges to potential and in
ation is stable, is
higher than the interest rate set for the euro area then in
ation might
speed up. In order to understand how big this risk is, we have to answer
two questions:
1. Does the natural interest rate in the Czech Republic dier signif-
icantly from the one in the euro area?
2. How sensitive is in
ation to deviations from the natural interest
rate?
Since the capital/labor ratio which determines the relative price of
capital changes over time, in transition economies typically increases,
also the natural interest rate dened as above has to be time-varying
(see Lipschitz et. al 2006). Dierent methods have been employed in the
literature to estimate time-varying natural interest rates (TVNIR), rang-
ing from various versions of the Taylor rule in Orphanides and Williams
(2002), a simple macroeconomic model in Laubach and Williams (2001)
where equilibrium interest rates and output gap are modelled as unob-
served components to a DSGE model with sticky prices and wages in
Smets and Wouters (2002). To our knowledge, there has been only one
paper thus far estimating a nominal, time-varying policy neutral rate for
the Czech Republic by Horv ath (2007). Based on various forward- and
backward-looking specications of simple Taylor-type monetary policy
rules he nds that the nominal policy neutral rate decreased form some
5% in 2001 to around 2% at the end of 2005 and increased subsequently
to some 2.5% in 2006. Moreover, he concludes that the deviation of the
actual nominal interest rate from the policy neutral (equilibrium) rate
is a useful predictor for future level and change of in
ation.
We, in contrast, will proceed in the spirit of Crespo-Cuaresma, Gnan
and Ritzberger-Gr unwald (2004) and estimate a TVNIR for the Czech
Republic in a parsimonious multivariate unobserved-components-model
(UCM). The estimation is thus based merely on the statistical proper-
ties without imposing any economic theory. This method which goes
back to Harvey (1989) aims at decomposing the time-series in a trend
component, a cyclical component and an irregular component and is ex-
plained in detail in the Appendix. Whereas estimation results for an
UCM for the Czech Republic are also reported in the Appendix in Table
3, Figure 6 depicts the estimated TVNIR graphically. While the esti-
mated dampening factor  is 0.841 the frequency parameter  amounts
19to 0.32 implying a cycle length of about 19 months. The Durbin-Watson
test statistic suggests that a rst-order autocorrelation of the residuals
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Figure 6: Real interest rate in the Czech Republic and the time-varying
natural interest rate
At the beginning of this subsection we raised two questions. The
rst one - how much does the real interest rate in the Czech Republic
deviate from the one in the euro area? - is addressed in Figure 7. The
chart displays the dierence between the actual real interest rate in the
Czech Republic and in the euro area (the most volatile line) and two
versions of the dierential between the natural rate of interest (NRI)
in both currency areas (the two smooth lines). While the NRI for the
Czech Republic was calculated in a univarite UCM for reasons explained
above, for the euro area we calculated the NRI both in a univariate UCM
(blue/solid line) as well as in a multivariate UCM (red/dashed line) since
for the euro area a multivariate version did work quite well and we came
27For reasons explained in the Appendix we opted for a univariate version of the
model. The estimation of a univariate UCM for industrial production looks signi-
cantly dierent than for the interest rate. Whereas  is 0.941,  is close to 0.15 which
corresponds to a cycle length of nearly 3.5 years. These results seem to match much
more closely the ndings obtained by Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004) in a multivari-
ate setting for the euro area. The discrepancy between the statistic features of the
two series in our estimations thus provide an ex-post explanation for why they are
dicult to \squeeze" into a multivariate model.
20very close to the results obtained by Crespo et al. (2004). Eyeballing the
NRI dierential it can be seen that a multivariate model tends to yield
a smoothed cyclical component (the dierence between the actual series
and the trend) with slightly smaller amplitude. The gure suggests that
since 2001 both measures of the NRI dierential have stayed within the
grey interval [ 1;1]. The maximum deviation of the actual Czech real
interest rate from the euro area reached some 2.5 percentage points on
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Figure 7: Real rate and NRI dierentials between the Czech Republic
and the EMU
What has been said so far is subject to one major caveat. The real
interest rate series for the Czech Republic which was used in our calcula-
tions necessarily includes risk premia that re
ect the markets' perception
of risk, particularly perils related to exchange rate changes and possibly
also to the scal position of the country. These risk premia, however,
will disappear after the euro adoption. Therefore, if we want to get some
feeling for how much the Czech real interest rate (actual or the NRI) will
deviate from its euro area counterpart under a common currency for the
sake of a fair analysis we rst have to purge the real rate series from
the risk premium. Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004) develop a method to
eliminate the risk premium from the nominal money market rates from
which a synthetic, risk-adjusted real rate series can easily be constructed.
21In the model, the time-varying risk premium is dened as the residual
part of the nominal interest rate spread with the EMU short-term inter-
est rate that cannot be explained by dierentials in in
ation expectations
and business cycle disharmony. Hence, the nominal interest rate spread
between the Czech Republic and the EMU (scr
t ) is regressed on the out-
put gap dierential (gcr
t  gemu
t ) and the in
ation expectation dierential


















































While we use as a measure for the output gap the cyclical compo-
nent of industrial production obtained in the previous estimation of a
univariate UCM, the in
ation expectations are computed as 12 months
ahead forecasts in an autoregressive model whose length28 is reestimated
at each point in time t so as to minimize the Akaike information crite-
rion. In order to estimate the in
ation expectations we thus had to split
the sample into two parts and it turned out that the best performance
was achieved if the rst forecasts were computed for January 1998. Due
to possible correlations between the error term 
t and the regressors29
the estimation was carried out by means of a two-stage least squares
estimation in which lags ranging between six and twelve months of the
output gap and in
ation expectation dierentials were used as instru-
ments. Table 4 in the Appendix shows the results of this estimation.
According to the denition spelled out above the risk premium in-
corporated in the Czech nominal interest rate corresponds to the sum of
the estimated constant b 0 and the random shock b 
t: Hence, the nominal





t   b 0   b 
t (2)
In Figure 8 we plot the adjusted real rate against the original series
and for the sake of comparison also the real rate of the euro area. It
might surprise that the adjusted real rate has been persistently above
the actual real rate since mid 1999. In other words, the gure suggests
that there has been a negative risk premium in the Czech Republic which
28At each t the maximum lag length is 12.
29In
ation expectations, for instance, might be driven by the same factors as the
risk premium.
22might re
ect the trend appreciation of the koruna vis- a-vis the euro.30
In analogy to Figure 7 we show in Figure 9 the dierence between ad-
justed real rate in the Czech Republic and the actual real rate in the
euro area as well as the two versions of the NRI-dierentials. Whereas
the adjusted real rate deviated at most by slightly more than 1 percent-
age point from the real rate in the euro area since the beginning of 2004,
the two NRI-dierentials have declined rapidly over the past couple of
years and are currently close to 0. It also strikes that while the actual
real rate was below the euro area level in the last three years or so of
the sample, the risk premium adjusted real rate has been well above the
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Figure 8: Adjusted and originial real rate in the Czech Republic versus
real rate in the EMU
Hence, the evidence provided so far suggests that despite a signi-
cant convergence of the Czech real and natural interest rates towards the
euro area level (particularly if purged from the risk premium) there re-
mains some little gap. Moreover, it is not quite unambiguous which sign
this gap would have if the euro was adopted now. Nevertheless, in the
next step we shall address the second question raised at the beginning
of this subsection. Namely, would it actually matter for the in
ation
30Between June 1999 and December 2006 the koruna appreciated in nominal terms









1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
univariate adjusted NRI differential
multivariate adjusted NRI differential
adjusted real rate differential
Figure 9: Adjusted real rate and NRI dierentials between the Czech
Republic and the EMU
path in the Czech Republic if the euro area NRI deviated from its Czech
counterpart? In other words, we are wondering how sensitive the in
a-
tion in the Czech Republic is to deviations from the natural rate. In
order to get some feeling for how relevant possibly desynchronized nat-
ural rates between the euro area and the Czech Republic might be after
the euro adoption we will approximate this future elasticity by the cur-
rent sensitivity of the in
ation to the deviation of the Czech real rate
from the NRI. We will use both the original as well as the adjusted se-
ries although Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004) conclude that the adjusted
series serves better as an indicator of in
ation development. Notwith-
standing, it should be emphasized at this point that the natural rate of
interest is an unobserved variable and the estimation thereof depends
essentially on the economic specication and the econometric method.
A whole raft of literature documents that policy rules based on such
unobserved variables, particularly if they are estimated in real time, are
subject to a substantial level of uncertainty (see Crespo-Cuaresma et
al. (2004) and other references therein). For this reason we will use in
our regressions as an alternative the NRI estimated by Horv ath (2007).31
31Horv ath (2007), to which we are grateful for sharing his results with us, estimates
nominal neutral rates which we will transform to real rates as described above.
243.2 One-o Factors Related to the Euro Changeover
As has been shown above, although the overall impact was moderate,
in some countries the prices for some goods and services did increase
noticeably after the changeover. In most cases, the eect was however
transitory. Still, there were clear dierences among the countries. Eife
(2005) who focuses on the price setting behaviour around the changeover
in Austria and Germany nds that in Austria, unlike in Germany, both
the transitory and the persistent increases were practically absent (de-
spite the substantial increase in perceived in
ation) barring a few iso-
lated exceptions such as hairdressing or language courses.
The most evident costs of a currency changeover are the so called
menu costs, i.e. costs of replacing the price tags and menus. The higher
the menu costs are the bigger the incentive for the rms to carry out
intended price adjustments at one stroke with the changeover. Hence,
price modications in the weeks or months preceding the euro adoption
will be postponed, those planned for the period after the changeover will
be brought forward. Menu costs are the usual explanation the literature
provides for the discrete price jumps that could be observed particularly
in the service sector.32
However, Eife (2005) concludes that price spikes in some sectors can
barely be explained by menu costs for two reasons. First, the increases
were too high so that they could be attributed solely to menu costs
and second, if the menu cost argument holds then one should observe
signicantly less frequent price changes before and after the changeover
which was however not the case for most analysed goods and services
categories. In contrast, according to the same study two factors appear
to have been more important for transitory price changes. On the one
hand, the so called 'initial confusion' argument seems to have been at
play which says that the public is puzzled by unfamiliar coins and notes.
In this situation similar to the initial confusion one experiences in a for-
eign country rms might be attempted to take advantage of this sort of
a temporary increase of their market power.33 On the other hand, how-
ever, there was a counteracting eect due to the higher sensitivity and
32See for example Hobijn et al. (2004) whose sticky price model generates a blip
in in
ation of the same magnitude observed in the data which can be explained by
menu costs.
33This view is supported also by Ehrmann (2006) who found that the denomination
of prices in a new currency had increased the information-processing requirements
for consumers by more than for sellers. In addition, this wedge grows with the
complexity of the currency conversion rates.
25awareness of the public and the media to price jumps. It thus turns out
that big corporations which were certainly under a much harsher media
pressure were much more hesitant to raise their prices and some of them,
such as fast-food chains in Austria, even welcomed the opportunity to
grab the headlines for reducing the prices.
Moreover, Eife (2005) nds that those services for which permanent
price hikes could be observed are also typically sold by small, only locally
active rms and are standardized in the sense that irrespective of the
provider the consumer has quite a precise expectation of what he or she
gets. Eife (2005) with reference to Tirole (1988) thus argues that these
are emblematic characteristics of markets for which collusive behavior is
typical and that the price increases were to a great extent driven by a
collective shift to a new, higher equilibrium. Yet based on data for Aus-
tria, which managed to create an environment in which both transitory
and permanent price increases were rare, Eife (2005) concludes some
normative recommendations that should help render the changeover a
mere nominal conversion event:
To address the initial confusion a suciently long period of dual
pricing is necessary.34 In the light of the Slovenian experience, how-
ever, reliance should not be solely placed on dual price display as an
anti-in
ation measure in itself, and a substantial emphasis should be
put also on fair-pricing agreements between the government and the pri-
vate sector (see Deloitte Consulting 2007). Moreover, as the ndings
made by Ehrmann (2006) suggest, the less complex the conversion rate
the smaller the confusion of the consumers and thus the smaller the
increase of rms' market power. To reduce the incentive for collective
price adjustments within a short period of time and to make the transi-
tion more gradual the replacement should extend over several months.35
In addition, to enhance the countervailing eect price observatories and
hotlines operated e.g. by the statistical oce or the central bank but
also by private institutions could be set up or stimulated. Although the
major threat for 'sinners' would probably be the attention by the media
an enforceable legal framework would certainly also help to curb the in-
centive to abuse the changeover.
34In Austria, after the expiration of the compulsory period between October 2001
and February 2002 in which prices had to be displayed in Schilling and Euro dual
pricing was still allowed after that. In Germany, in contrast, dual pricing was possible,
not obligatory, prior to January 2002 but was no longer allowed after the 2-months
transition period.
35While it was more than 12 months in Austria, in Germany the replacement period
lasted only 2 months.
26As we have seen in Figure 1 irrespective of the actual in
ation path
the perceived in
ation rose in all countries following the introduction of
euro coins and notes. Aucremanne et al. (2007) conrm formally the
hypothesis that this perception break was signicantly induced by the
euro changeover. In contrast to the widespread opinion in the literature,
they do not nd any support for the nding that perceptions are sys-
tematically biased by frequently purchased goods and services (see e.g.
Del Giovane and Sabbatini 2006) or that the perception gap was more
pronounced for consumers with some specic socio-economic character-
istics (see e.g. Fluch and Stix 2007 or Lindn 2006). Hence, whereas the
ndings on these issues might not be unambiguous, Traut-Mattausch et
al (2004) provide strong experimental evidence suggesting that people's
judgments on price trends are biased towards price increases if prices are
denominated in the new and unfamiliar currency, the euro.
These results are thus probably another manifestation of an anomaly
that Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) called the 'status quo bias' - peo-
ple's preference for the current state and their implied mistrust of new
states. This phenomenon like other anomalies is a materialization of the
so called 'loss aversion' - an asymmetry rst documented by Kahneman
and Tversky (1984) - which states that the disutility of losing an object
is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it (see Kahneman
et al. 1991). In the spirit of the status quo bias the disadvantages of a
change thus loom higher in people's minds than the advantages of it. The
size of this misalignment depends certainly crucially on the expectations
people form on the advantages and disadvantages of the change. The
expectation formation, in turn, is undoubtedly essentially in
uenced by
the media, the institutions and the authorities people trust in such as
high-rank politicians, the central bank or commercial banks.36 37
In the Czech Republic, where a great part of the discussion on costs
and benets of the euro centres around the in
ationary impact of the
euro, a vast majority of the participants in the debate supports the hy-
pothesis that the euro will lead to a marked in
ation acceleration, i.a.
also because of the change-over. So it is probably little surprising that
80% of the Czechs, 6 percentage points above the average in the New
36Del Giovane and Sabbatini (2006) or Boeri (2004), for instance, provide evidence
suggesting that there is a positive relationship between in
ation perception and the
attention the press pays to the phenomenon.
37For the preference ranking of trusted distributors of information see Eurobarom-
eter (2007).
27Member States, believe that the euro will increase prices when it is rst
introduced and two thirds of the respondents are afraid of abuses and
cheating on prices during the changeover (see Eurobarometer 2007). A
balanced and detailed information campaign on the impacts of the euro
changeover as well as a set of orchestrated measures proposed in the pre-
vious paragraph would certainly have an impact on these gures. Most
likely they would tame those fears and accelerated in
ation expectations
because as Fluch and Stix (2007) and, in a slightly dierent phrasing,
also Lindn (2006) document uninformed respondents tend to have sig-
nicantly higher both in
ation perception and expectation values than
the informed ones.
Obviously, it is impossible to control for the eects of the current
or future information campaign. However, we will test in our regression
how in
ation expectations impact actual in
ation rates. If this impact
turned out to be rather strong as e.g. Paloviita and Virn (2005) show
for the euro area in a VAR using in
ation forecasts from the OECD then
the numbers on expected in
ationary eects of the euro should probably
be addressed with more vigour well in advance of the euro introduction
as they could end up in self-fullling equilibria with higher in
ation
rates. The data on qualitative in
ation expectations are collected from
the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer Sur-
veys regularly conducted by the European Commission's Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Aairs. Similarly to the perceived
in
ation the series on in
ation expectations is a balance statistic cal-
culated as the dierence between a weighted proportion of respondents
stating that prices will increase and those stating that prices will stay
the same or fall.38
4 Econometric Evidence
4.1 Method and Data Description
In this section we now proceed to test econometrically the relative im-
portance of the factors collected so far along with other cyclical and
external variables the choice of which we base primarily on the results
38There are six possible answers to the question: "By comparison with
the past 12 months, how do you expect that consumer prices will develop
in the next 12 months? They will..." A(1) "increase more rapidly"; A(2)
"increase at the same rate"; A(3) "increase at a slower rate"; A(4) "stay
about the same"; A(5) "fall" and A(6) "do not know". The balance statis-
tic is thus computed as: Bit = Ait(1) + 0:5Ait(2)   0:5Ait(4)   Ait(5) (See:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy nance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys en.htm)
28obtained by  Egert (2007a). Given the availability of the data and the
auxiliary calculations described above the adjusted sample ranges from
January 1998 to December 2006. All variables as used in the model are
stationary according to the ADF test on conventional signicance levels
and if not available on monthly basis they were linearly interpolated.
In addition to the variables dened so far we included in the regres-
sion also the output gap for which we use three dierent measures: the
cyclical component of industrial production relative to its trend result-
ing from the estimation of a unilateral unobserved components model
described above and two output gap measures obtained from the Euro-
pean Commission.39 The other cyclical variables are the annual rate of
change of unit labor costs and the y-o-y change of central government
expenditures relative to GDP.
To control for structural phenomena spelt out above, the pricing to
market eekt and the shift to higher quality goods, we include linearly
interpolated data on GDP per capita at PPP40. Concerning the B-S-
eect, three dierent approaches have been employed in the empirical
literature to derive its impact on in
ation. Following  Egert (2007b) we
will use the simple accounting framework which assumes that changes
in the productivity dierential are proportionately translated into the
relative price change of non-tradables pNT pT = prodT prodNT.
At the same time, the impact of non-tradable in
ation (pNT) in excess
of tradable in
ation (pT) is established by the share of non-tradables
in the CPI basket (1   ): p = (1   )(pNT   pT). Therefore, the
part of in
ation ascribable to the B-S-eect (pB S) can be written as
p






The quarterly data is obtained from ARAD, the CNB's time series
database and the Czech Statistical Oce (CSO). Productivity is calcu-
lated as gross value added in the respective sector divided by total hours
worked. We approximate the tradable sector by manufacturing (D in
the 17-sectoral decomposition of Eurostat) while the non-tradable sec-
39The measures are dened as the relative gap between actual and, respectively,
trend or potential gross domestic product at 2000 market prices.
40Source: New Cronos. Since GDP per capita appears to be growing almost expo-
nentially we dened this variable as the month-on-month change of the y-o-y growth
of GDP per capita which can be interpreted as the short term acceleration of the
GDP/capita growth rate
29tor consists of construction (F in the Eurostat nomenclature) and market
services (G-K in the Eurostat nomenclature). Services where prices are
regulated such as agriculture, energy, water supply and public admin-
istration are excluded because prices there do not necessarily react to
productivity changes in a market manner. The parameter (1   ) thus
ammounts to 0.25 (see  Egert (2007a). If the B-S-eect plays a signicant
role in the Czech Republic then the productivity dierential should have
a positive impact on in
ation.
Apart from the two already mentioned alternatives which are sup-
posed to capture the exchange rate pass-through the set of external
variables includes also the y-o-y change of the crude oil price. Next we
constructed two dummy variables for VAT increases and decreases, re-
spectively. They equal 1 in those months in which the VAT rate was
raised/lowered and also in those months in which a product or service
group was moved from the preferential rate to the basic rate or vice
versa. If two counteracting eects occurred simultaneously then we set
that dummy equal to one for which the consumption basket weight of the
goods and services in question was bigger. In all other months the dum-
mies equal zero.41 Finally, we include in
ation expectations and three
alternative measures for the deviation of the real interest rate from the
natural interest rate on the grounds developed above. A neat list of all
variables can be seen in Table 5 in the Appendix.
To account also for the impact of past in
ation values on future
in
ation we will employ an autoregressive distributed lag model of the
form







jxt j + "t (4)
where t stands for in
ation, xt j for a vector of regressors lagged
by j. The error term "t is assumed to be serially uncorrelated and ho-
moskedastic. Given the limited length of the sample we restrict the set
of lags to p 2 f1;6;12g and r 2 f0;1;6;12g which should still allow us
to capture the contemporaneous as well as the short-, mid- and long-
term eect of each variable. The estimations are carried out using OLS.
However, to determine the lag length for each variable we rst tried two
alternative model selection techniques. The rst one was a general-to-
specic strategy based on hypothesis testing. We thus started out from
41I would like to thank my mother, a tax adviser, for helping me out with the
tedious work through the tax code.
30the biggest model including all variables and all possible lags. Then
we proceeded iteratively and in each round we eliminated the least sig-
nicant regressor (=variable-lag-combination), the one with the highest
p-value, until we were left with a parsimonious model containing only
regressors signicant on the ve percent level. The second strategy se-
lects iteratively from all possible models of which there are 2K, where
K stands for the number of initial regressors, the one with the lowest
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). Since the maximum number of
initial variables we tested was 13, the implied maximum number of re-
gressors was 51 (= 4*13-1). If the computation of one iteration step took
only, say, 0,001 seconds than it would take more than 71 000 years to go
through all models. Therefore we had to reduce the intractable model
space which we did by means of the so called Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Model Composite (MC3) method explained in the Appendix.
There are, however, a couple of major problems with these two model
selection strategies. Under the test based general-to-specic strategy the
model space is strongly limited as it starts from the biggest model whose
size is then iteratively reduced but it does not take into account possi-
ble model alternatives with variables that have been already excluded.
Implicitly this procedure thus imposes a rather strong restriction as it
presumes to know a limited model space in which the true model has
to be included. In fact, however, this is not the case. Given the lack of
an unambiguous theoretical framework that would uniquely determine
which variables and lags are to be chosen in an equation attempting to
explain in
ation, we do not know either the true model or a restricted
subset of all possible models from which the true model has to be re-
cruited. Hence, we face a substantial level of model uncertainty that
has to be taken into account. Although the strategy based on the SIC
does in principal consider all perceivable models it did not perform much
better. Namely, both strategies dier strongly in the models they choose
and they do not converge to one model as one would expect owing to
the fact that they are extremely sensitive to the denition of variables
and the initial specication. Yang (2004) who compares hypothesis test-
ing and model selection strategies both theoretically and empirically
concludes that "when model selection rules give very dierent answers,
model combining is a better alternative approach for estimation and pre-
diction. With a proper weighting, the large variability of the estimator
from model selection can be substantially reduced."
A way to combine models with a proper weighting is the so called
Bayesian model averaging (BMA) methodology which proposes averag-
31ing of the parameter values over all (relevant) alternative models using
posterior model probabilities as respective weights to evaluate the rela-
tive importance of dierent variables (see Raftery (1995) for a general
discussion). A brief explanation of this method following closely Crespo-
Cuaresma and Slacik (2007) is provided in the Appendix.
For each variable we sum the posterior probabilities of those mod-
els visited by the MC3 algorithm that include the respective variable.
This sum, the so called posterior inclusion probability, is a measure that
captures the relative importance of the dierent covariates as determi-
nants of in
ation. It can be interpreted as the probability that a given
variable belongs to the true specication. Since we assign equal priors
to all models, our prior on the inclusion probability of each variable is
0.5.42 Moreover, we can also use the inclusion probability as a model
selection criterion and combine the Bayesian and frequentist approach.
In a Bayesian based 'frequentist check' we thus keep only those regresors
whose model averaged parameters have an inclusion probability equal to
or greater than the prior benchmark 0.5 and run a new estimation only
with these regressors.
4.2 Estimation Results
The application of the BMA methodology in combination with the MC3
algorithm produced much more robust results than either of the two
other methods. The selection procedure chose under most amendments
the model presented in Table 1. We report under 'BMA' the parameter
averages and inclusion probabilites of those regressors with an inclusion
probability equal to or greater than 0.5. Under 'Frequentist check' the
reader may nd the usual 'frequentist' output from a regression run with
those regressors that have been selected using inclusion probability as a
model selection criterion.
42There are 2
 K 1 models including a given variable and 2
 K total models, so the
prior inclusion probability of a given variable is 2
 K 1 /2
 K =0.5. Intuitively it means












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lAs can be seen, except for the productivity dierential the regressors
have an interpretable sign and the estimates reveal interesting infor-
mation on the determinants of in
ation in the Czech Republic. While
in
ation appears highly persistent in the short-run, in the long-run high
in
ation rates tend to reduce future in
ation. The latter is probably a
result of the strong disin
ation process that took place in the Czech Re-
public in the sample period. Another or additional interpretation of this
result could be that restrictive measures of monetary policy implemented
as a reaction to high in
ation kick in with a 12-month-lag. Adjustments
of regulated prices have a strong and long-lasting impact on overall in
a-
tion. In
ation typically rises in the month in which administered prices
are raised but falls in the immediately following month. A weak, pos-
itive correlation between regulated and overall prices is found also for
the 12-month-lag. The long-run eect of the regulated price in
ation,







where j and 
i refer to the model specication in (4)(see Greene
2003), is 0.154 meaning that a 10% increase of regulated prices raises
overall in
ation in the long-run by 1.5 percentage points. In addition, if
today's real interest rate deviates from the natural interest rate upwards
by 1 percentage point the in
ation in 12 months will be dampened by 0.3
percentage points. These results appear plausible and the only variable
we struggle with is the productivity dierential supposed to capture the
B-S-eect. If the B-S-eect in the Czech Republic was an issue, the pa-
rameter should be at least positive as the higher productivity growth in
the tradable sector relative to the non-tradable sector the higher should
be the pressure on wages in the latter and thus on the overall CPI. This
seems not to be the case in the Czech Republic and our results thus
replicate the ndings in the existing literature.
This resulting parsimonious model was rather robust to alternative
denitions of the variables and also to the initial specication of the
model.43 The results changed slightly though, if we employed the natu-
ral rate of interest obtained by Horv ath (2007) as can be seen in Table 2.
Unlike in the previous model this time the BMA procedure did not se-
lect any of the two, not easily interpretable regressors - the productivity
dierential and the twelfth lag of the regulated prices in
ation. Other
43We did not experiment only with various alternative denitions of the variables
but also with the number of variables initially included.
34than that, the remaining variables showed up at the same lags and the
coecients have the same signs and similar magnitudes as before. Only
the long-run eect of the in
ation of regulated prices amounts now to
0.058. The inclusion probability of all other factors did not surpass the
prior threshold to enter the nal equation.
Hence, according to our estimates neither scal policy (including
VAT changes), nor cyclical factors, nor the increasing income of house-
holds seem to be accelerating in
ation. Moreover, external factors also
appear to matter very little. In particular, in line with the existing liter-
ature also in our results the exchange rate pass-through turns out to be
rather weak so that the lack of the appreciating currency after the euro
adoption should have no dramatic impact on in
ation. Unless we inter-
pret the rst lag of the in
ation variable as a backward-looking in
ation
expectation, our results provide very little support for expectations be-
ing a relevant in
ation determinant - a result that seems to contradict
conclusions drawn by other studies on the euro area. In further research
may be alternative measures of in
ation expectations should be tested
to shed more light on this issue.44
44The modelling system of the Czech National Bank (CNB) assumes that in
ation
expectations are formed predominantly by the latest in
ation developments and to a
lesser extent by the forecast for future in
ation in a ratio of 90:10 (see Box in CNB'
In
ation Report, January 2005). Hence, it could be argued that in a way in
ation






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)5 Summary and Policy Conclusions
The debate on costs and benets of the euro in the Czech Republic is
very much focused on one particular aspect { the impact of the common
currency on in
ation. Against this background, in the present study we
analyse in a qualitative and quantitative manner the channels through
which the euro adoption might have an eect on in
ation both in the
short and long run, embedded in a framework of cyclical, structural and
external in
ation factors. As we do not aspire to provide an overall anal-
ysis of the net welfare gains of the single currency but concentrate on
one specic issue of monetary integration in this paper, our ndings do
not allow to answer the question of when to adopt the euro in the Czech
Republic.
After a brief sketch of some stylized facts drawn from current euro
area members in the rst module of the paper we proceed in the sec-
ond one to a qualitative discussion of both, the long-term determinants
impacting trend in
ation as well as the one-o in
ation risks related
to the changeover. With respect to the former we argue that neither
higher price transparency nor the usual continuous drivers of price level
convergence can explain any discrete in
ation jump after the adoption
of the euro. However, for the sake of a sustainably stable in
ation the
fullment of the Maastricht in
ation criterion should not be enforced by
any non-standard policy measures. As regards in
ationary risks of the
changeover, we illustrate that there are better and worse ways to handle
them and although they can probably not be eliminated altogether they
might be substantially reduced by best-practice policies as the experi-
ence of a number of current euro area members suggests.
In the third and last bulding block of the paper we employ an ARDL
model to test the relative importance of various in
ation drivers. Since
standard model selection criteria do not provide a clear picture, following
the recommendations made in the theoretical literature for such cases
we combine all models under an appropriate weighting scheme by using
the Bayesian Model Averaging algorithm while we reduce the intractably
large model space by the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Compos-
ite algorithm. An additional innovation of our paper is the estimation
of the time-varying natural rate of interest by means of an unobserved
components model both from the actual series as well as from a series
purged from the risk premia.
We do not nd much evidence underpinning the line of argument
usually put forward according to which in
ation will rise because of the
37absence of the appreciating koruna. In line with earlier empirical studies,
in our results, too, the exchange rate pass through appears rather weak
which implies a faster price level convergence in case of a currency ap-
preciation but a relatively low dampening eect of nominal appreciation
on CPI in
ation. In addition, according to our estimates neither scal
policy (including VAT changes), nor cyclical factors, nor the increasing
wealth of households have an accelerating impact on in
ation. In con-
trast, a recently observed in
ation rates are highly signicant for future
in
ation rates. This result, which might be interpreted as a backward-
looking in
ation expectations, suggests that a low in
ation environment
is very supportive for price stability in the future. In
ation also seems
quite sensitive to deviations from the natural interest rate. Hence, a har-
monization of business cycles between the Czech Republic and the euro
area seem to be an important prerequisite to contain in
ation volatility
after euro adoption.
A nal aspect is the euro's impact on perceived in
ation. Given the
loss aversion of economic agents which has been well documented by
experimental economics it is certainly a challenging task to tackle the
rife and deeply embedded opinion that the euro raises prices. To ad-
dress this issue as eectively as possible, an even-handed, transparent
and fair information campaign on the in
ation aspects of the euro is key.
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Table 3: Univariate unobserved components model
42Dep. Var.: Interest rate spread btw. CR and EMu
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Sample (adj.) 1999/M01 2006/M12
Incl. observations: 96 after adjustments
Instrument list Output gap(-6 to -12), Inf. expectation di.(-6 to -12)
Variable Coecient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
const.  1:549415 0:279479  5:543945 0:0000
Output gap  26:84044 10:15148  2:643994 0:0096





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































s6.1 Unobserved Components Models
The estimation of an unobserved components models is based merely on
the statistical properties without imposing any economic theory. This
method which goes back to Harvey (1989) aims at decomposing the
time-series in a trend component (t), a cyclical component (t) and an
irregular component (ut). The vector zt = (rt;yt;t) consisting of real
interest rate rt, output yt and in
ation t can thus be written as
zt = t + t + ut;ut v IID(0;u) (5)
where the multivariate trend component t follows a random walk with
drift t which follows a random walk itself:
t =t 1 + t 1 + t;t v IID(0;) (6)
t =t 1 +  t; t v IID(0; ) (7)
In addition, the error terms t,  t and ut are assumed to be mutually



























t) v IID(0;I 
 !) are also assumed to be uncorrelated
with other errors, the dampening factor  2 h0;1i and frequency  2
h0;2i are assumed to be time-invariant and equal across variables in
z . The state space model formulation enables the application of the
Kalman lter. Via the prediction error decomposition the Kalman lter
opens the gate to the maximum likelihood estimation of the unknown
parameters (Harvey 1989:100 et seq.). We will opt for ltered or real-
time estimates which use information available up to t 1 while forming
expectations on the unobservable state at time t (
f
t = E(t j fztg
t 1
t=0).46
45A univariate (non-stochastic) cycle can be most conveniently expressed as a
mixture of sine and cosine waves:  t = cost +  sint; t = 1;:::;T: The
period of the cycle (time taken to go through the complete sequence of values)
is given by 2= while functions of  and  determine the amplitude and the
















with  0 =  and  
0 = :
46In contrast, smoothed estimates would exploit information contained in the entire
sample (s
t = E(t j fztg
T
t=0).
45In line with the literature we use ex-ante real interest rates dened
as the prevailing three-month money market rate in t, available at Eu-
rostat, minus in
ation between t   1 and t. We used the longest avail-
able monthly in
ation series on the CPI which can be retrieved from the
OECD and our estimation sample thus ranged from January 1993 to De-
cember 2006. However, as a robustness check we alternatively employed
a much shorter series (starting in January 1997) on CPI excluding food
and energy and the HICP obtained from Eurostat without signicant
changes in the results. Output y we approximated by the logged sea-
sonally adjusted industrial production which is available on a monthly
basis from the OECD.
In order to estimate the model initial values for cycle determining
parameters have to be specied. As noted above though the parameters
 and  are assumed to be identical for all variables and they should be
set so that the cyclical component of the model corresponds to the busi-
ness cycle. We tested -values that imply business cycle length ranging
between two and six years and -values between 0.7 and 0.99. unfor-
tunately, for the Czech Republic we cannot conrm the nding made
by Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004) for the EU that the estimated pa-
rameters are robust to the choice of the starting values of  and  in a
multivariate model. This might be due to not really synchronized cycles
of the three variables over the course of the transition period and/or
due to the substantially shorter time series which might be a problem as
the simultaneous estimation reduces the degrees of freedom. However,
estimation results are robust to the initial specication of the parameter
values if a univariate approach is employed. Having to choose between
these two second-best possibilities we decided to opt for the univari-
ate, but robust approach. Moreover, estimation results improved if the
trend component was assumed to be smooth with the variance of the
error term t equal to 0.
6.2 Bayesian Model Averaging and MC3
A way to combine models with a proper weighting is the so called
Bayesian model averaging (BMA) methodology which proposes aver-
aging of the parameter values over all (relevant) alternative models us-
ing posterior model probabilities as respective weights to evaluate the
relative importance of dierent variables (see Raftery (1995) for a gen-
eral discussion). In what follows we provide a brief explanation of this
method following closely Crespo-Cuaresma and Slacik (2007).
46In a situation where there are M = 2
 K competing models, fM1;:::;MMg47
which are dened by the choice of independent variables, Bayesian infer-
ence about the parameter of interest i is based on its posterior distri-











The posterior model probabilities can thus be obtained as the normalized
product of the integrated likelihood for each model (P(YjMk)) and the
prior probability of the model (P(Mk)). This implies that for a given
prior on the model space, the posterior distribution of  can be obtained
as a weighted average of the model-specic estimates weighted by the
posterior probability of the respective models. If the cardinality of the
model space is computationally tractable, (10) can be obtained directly
and (9) can be computed. In particular, the expected value of  and its












The posterior mean and variance can thus be used to make inference
while they explicitly take into account model uncertainty. Several meth-
ods have been proposed for approximating the expression in (10) when
the cardinality of the model space makes the problem intractable (see
Raftery, (1995) for an excellent description of these methods).
Leaning on the work of Madigan and York (1995) and the recent
empirical application to the determinants of currency crises in Crespo-
Cuaresma and Slacik (2007) we also used in our two model selection
47K is again the number of regressors.
47strategies that consider the entire, but intractable model space (the just
spelled out BMA and the previously described SIC-strategy) the Markov
Chain Monte Carlo Model Composite (MC3) algorithm. This method
implements the Random Walk Chain Metropolis-Hastings algorithm in
the model space as follows. In a given replication r of the algorithm,
a candidate model Mr+1 is randomly drawn from a set which consists
of all models that contain either one variable more or one variable less
than the model active in that replication (Mr). The proposed model,










which is just the Bayes factor comparing Mr and Mr+1 if equal prior
probability is assumed across models, so that P(Mr) and P(Mr+1) cancel
out in the expression above. This algorithm is repeated a large num-
ber of times, and the sums dened above are computed for the group
of models replicated, which will tend to cover model subspaces with the
highest posterior probability.
48